Why Psilocybin Could Link Love, Happiness, and Moral Behavior in a Self-Reinforcing Loop

Debates over moral bioenhancement, using biomedical tools to improve moral motivation, have largely been framed by Persson and Savulescu, who justify it as a way to prevent 'ultimate harm' and who favor making it compulsory. Critics say this undermines freedom. This paper offers a different rationale rooted in well-being: people may choose enhancement because it makes them happier.

This is a philosophical and conceptual analysis, not an experiment. The author draws on psychology and philosophy of love, including Fromm, Weil, Kant, and Fisher, and on happiness research from Dunn, Anik, Sheldon, and Lyubomirsky. The core claim is that love, happiness, and morality sustain one another in a 'triple circularly supportive relationship'. The author defends 'integrated love', in which universal agape and particular loves such as romantic, familial, and friendly love complement rather than rank above one another.

The cited literature suggests that prosocial acts, including spending small amounts like $5 on others, raise happiness, and that happier people tend to be more generous. The author extends this by reasoning that moral action deepens love through empathy and shared humanity, and that happy people tend to trust and love more. Love, in turn, motivates moral behavior and fosters happiness, as shown by research on diverse relationships. The author also criticizes Earp and Savulescu's 'Love Drugs' for focusing mainly on romantic love.

The paper then argues that psilocybin may be a superior 'love drug'. Drawing on the author's earlier work, it claims psilocybin evokes selflessness and oneness that directly drive altruism and love, rather than acting indirectly through empathy as oxytocin, vasopressin, and SSRIs may. It is also described as relaxing rigid thinking, reducing brooding rumination, and stimulating joy, unlike antidepressants that mainly reduce depressive symptoms. Dosing should be appropriate, and use should be combined with meditation under a medical specialist and an experienced meditation guide.

The author concludes that because these substances increase happiness, people will voluntarily adopt them, and that this may lower the risk of ultimate harm without coercion. The author also suggests such use could be a moral duty insofar as happiness and morality are duties. Caveats: the argument is theoretical, leans on commonsense observations and the author's prior publications, and does not present new clinical data on psilocybin's effects, risks, or long-term outcomes. The causal loop is asserted more than demonstrated, and the 'moral duty' claim is contestable.